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CONTRACTING FOR PUBLICATION RIGHTS IN LIEU OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CRIMINAL CASES
INTRODUCTION
This Comment will discuss ethical problems associated with
an attorney contracting with a criminal defendant for book and
movie publication rights in return for legal representation.1 This
discussion will address the concerns surrounding such retainer
agreements reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility2 as
well as recent case law on the subject.' In view of the many
problems created by an attorney-client book and movie publication
agreement, this Comment will suggest a per se rule requiring dis-
qualification of any attorney who contracts for such a fee
arrangement.
The Code of Professional Responsibility and the new proposed
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility 4 specifically prohibit an
attorney from entering into a book and movie publication rights
agreement in return for his services. In such an agreement, the cli-
ent assigns the attorney an interest in the book and movie publica-
tion rights relating to his alleged criminal acts. These publication
rights can unconsciously influence an attorney's judgment so that
he acts contrary to the best interests of his client. The legal profes-
sion has recognized the potential for conflict inherent in this type
of retainer agreement and has chosen to prohibit these
1. For a general discussion of this topic, see Nat'l L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 1; Lieberman &
Stewart, Making Money Off Murder, STUDENT LAWYER, Feb., 1982, at 23; Annot., 53 A.L.R.
FED. 140 (1981).
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY ( amended 1981) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE].
3. Maxwell v. Supreme Court of Los Angeles County, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980), va-
cated, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982); People v. Corona, 80 Cal.
App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978); Ray'v. Rose, 491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 936 (1974); People v. Fuller, 21 IM. App. 3d 437, 315 N.E.2d 687 (1974), petition for
writ of habeas corpus denied, 421 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Ill. 1976); United States v. Hearst, 466
F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL RULES].
483
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
relationships.
Canon Five of the current Code of Professional Responsibility
states: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judg-
ment on Behalf of a Client."5 Further, Disciplinary Rule 5-104(B)
states:
Prior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employ-
ment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a
client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in publication
rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed
employment.6
An American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards has recently published the Final Draft of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.7 Rule 1.8, "Conflict of
Interest: Prohibited Transactions,"8 incorporates some of the con-
cerns addressed by Canon Five of the present Code. Subdivision
(d) states: "Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer
literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substan-
tial part on information relating to the representation."
Despite the absolute prohibition against these agreements in
Disciplinary Rule 5-104(B), defense attorneys have continued to
5. MODEL CODE Canon 5.
6. Id., DR 5-104(B). The corresponding Ethical Consideration provides:
If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to receive
from his client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject
matter of the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the interests of
his client to his own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a crim-
inal case who obtains from his client television, radio, motion picture, newspa-
per, magazine, book, or other publication rights with respect to the case may be
influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance
the value of his publication rights to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these
potentially differing interests, such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided
prior to the termination of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the employ-
ment, even though his employment has previously ended.
MODEL CODE EC 5-4. The preliminary statement of the Code states: "The Ethical Consider-
ations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member
of the profession should strive." The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in character and
"state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action." Id.
7. MODEL RuLEs.
8. Id. at Rule 1.8.
9. Id. at Rule 1.8, 1 (d). This rule does not prohibit an attorney representing a client in
a transaction concerning literary property from acquiring an ownership interest in such
property. Id. at Rule 1.8 comment.
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enter into fee arrangements for literary rights.1l It appears that the
threat of possible disciplinary sanctions imposed by an ethics com-
mittee of one's peers is not a sufficient deterrent in view of the
potential financial benefits to be derived.11 In that the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the disciplinary process have failed
to adequately discourage these retainer agreements, the courts
have been forced to adjudicate their propriety. Litigation of this
issue has occurred most frequently in the form of habeas corpus
proceedings which allege that the literary contract retainer agree-
ment created such a conflict of interest between the attorney and
client that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel
as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 2 In examining these
claims, the courts have paid little attention to the existence of Dis-
ciplinary Rule 5-104(B). Instead, the courts have noted an "appar-
ent" violation of the rule, requiring the defendant to prove that
the conflict of interest had an adverse or prejudicial effect on the
outcome of the defendant's trial. While the Disciplinary Rule im-
poses the threat of punishment on the defense attorney, the defen-
dant may be imprisoned as a consequence of the attorney's unethi-
cal behavior.13
This Comment encourages the creation of a per se rule of dis-
qualification to advance the ethical standards sought by the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The use of the Professional Code of
Responsibility as a set of procedural rules has been frowned upon.
10. A District of Columbia attorney, Sol Rozen, has been charged with unethical con-
duct in relation to a literary retainer agreement. He was allegedly to receive $50,000, which
had been placed in trust, from the sale of his client's story. In his own defense, Mr. Rozen
claimed that his client drew up the clandestine trust agreement so that he could claim con-
flict of interest and petition for a new trial if convicted. Nat'l L. J., Dec. 21, 1981, at 5.
11. Each state has adopted a provision similar to Rule 5-104(B). Georgia has the only
state code which refers to possible disciplinary sanction. The GEORGIA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY states: "A violation of this standard may be punished with a public
reprimand." GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9, pt. 4, ch. 1, Rule 4-102, Standard 34 (Supp. 1982). An
ethical opinion rendered by the New York County Lawyers Association makes no reference
to appropriate disciplinary action for violating Rule 5-104(B). N.Y. County No. 582 (Oct. 23,
1970). The possibility of disciplinary action has been recognized by the courts. See infra
note 60.
12. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment provides an accused with the right "to have the Assis-
tance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
13. No apparent stance has been adopted by the American Bar Association as to how
courts should consider a defendant's appeal based on a claim of ineffective counsel due to
the existence of a literary retainer agreement.
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One commentator has urged that the Code and its rules be applied
only in disciplinary proceedings against attorneys.1 4 Such a retro-
spective and passive application of the Code serves to emasculate
much of the underlying ethical policy within the Code.
I. PREVIOUS JUDICIAL ENCOUNTERS WITH LITERARY RETAINER
AGREEMENTS
The most recent examination of a literary retainer agreement
occurred in Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles.15 This Sec-
tion will discuss the Maxwell decision and previous judicial en-
counters with literary retainer agreements. These prior cases in-
clude People v. Corona,"6 in which the existence of a literary
retainer agreement was found to have sufficiently influenced an at-
torney's conduct to render his representation ineffective. However,
in two other cases, Ray v. Rose17 and People v. Fuller,8 the defen-
dants were unable to establish a showing of ineffective assistance
of counsel to the satisfaction of the court. Finally, People v.
Hearst"" will be examined, in which one court appeared to adopt a
new standard to be applied in determining the existence of poten-
tially ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of a conflict of
interest. An examination of these cases reveals many of the
problems that arise from attorney-client literary rights contracts.
In this Section, the Maxwell cases will be discussed in relation to
prior literary contract cases20 in order to illustrate the need for a
per se rule of disqualification in this area.
Bobby Joe Maxwell was arrested on April 4, 1979 and charged
with ten separate counts of murder. Maxwell retained private
counsel to represent him. On April 26, 1979, Maxwell's defense
14. See Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C.L.
REV. 497 (1979). Sutton opposes the use of the Code and its rules by the courts in establish-
ing an enforceable standard of conduct. He argues that the Code should be utilized only
within the realm of disciplinary proceedings instituted by the bar.
15. 161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980), vacated, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177
(1982).
16. 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978).
17. 491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
18. 21 II. App. 3d 437, 315 N.E.2d 687 (1974), petition for writ of habeas corpus de-
nied, 421 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
19. 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980).
20. See cases cited supra note 3.
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counsel21 requested the Superior Court Magistrate to appoint an
investigator to assist the defense at the government's expense due
to the defendant's indigency. At this time, defense counsel dis-
closed to the magistrate the fee arrangement established between
counsel and his client.2 In return for legal representation by the
attorney, up to and including trial, Maxwell "transferred irrevoca-
bly and unconditionally to the attorneys all literary rights and in-
terest in the story of his life and in the pending criminal prosecu-
tion and trial."23 Maxwell was allowed to retain fifteen percent of
the net profits derived by his attorney from the literary rights.
Prior to the preliminary hearing, the magistrate questioned
the defendant's comprehension of the fee arrangement. Maxwell
expressed an understanding of the conflicts of interest created by
the agreement and a willingness to accept them. Subsequent to
that inquiry, Maxwell was arraigned in Superior Court and entered
a plea of not guilty.
2 '
On September 14, 1979, the trial court held a special hearing,
sua sponte, to determine the propriety of the literary rights re-
tainer agreement. The trial court was particularly concerned with
the provision of the retainer agreement labeled "Disclosure of Con-
flicts of Interest."25 The provision pointed out that the agreeinent
21. The name of Maxwell's defense attorneys were not given in the court's opinion.
This is a common form of protection used in the legal profession when referring to possible
violations of ethical standards. See Rani, Appealing a Lawyer's "Mistakes," Nat'l L. J., Oct.
5, 1981, at 18.
22. 161 Cal. Rptr. at 851. This information appears to have been disclosed voluntarily
to the magistrate or in the course of the request for an appointed investigator.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 852.
25. Id. at 852. The text of the paragraph reads:
IT IS HEREBY DISCLOSED BY THE LAWYERS TO MAXWELL that the provisions of this
agreement may create a conflict of interest between Maxwell and the Lawyers
and that the provisions of this agreement may give to the Lawyers a monetary
interest adverse to the interests of Maxwell. This conflict of interest may mani-
fest itself in many ways including but not limited to the following: (a) The Law-
yers may have an interest to create publicity which would increase the money
which they might get as a result of this agreement, even if this publicity hurt
Maxwell's defense. (b) The Lawyers may have an interest not to raise certain
defenses which would question the sanity or mental capacity of Maxwell because
to raise these. defenses might make this agreement between the Lawyers and
Maxwell void or voidable by Maxwell. (c) The Lawyers may have an interest in
having Maxwell be convicted and even sentenced to death so that there would
be increased publicity which might mean that the Lawyers would get more
money as a result of this agreement. (d) The Lawyers may have other interests
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could possibly create conflicts of interest between Maxwell and his
attorney. For example, the agreement anticipated that conflicts
could arise in relation to the attorney's interest in increased trial
publicity, failure to raise certain defenses, and the increased
saleability of Maxwell's story should he be convicted and sen-
tenced to death.26 Defense counsel declared that none of these po-
tential conflicts would influence his representation of the defen-
dant. Further, the trial court was troubled by the advance waiver
of the attorney-client privilege (perhaps discouraging the defen-
dant from fully confiding in his attorney) and by the fact that the
retainer agreement only applied to the trial itself with no reference
to any appeal process.2"
At the special hearing, defendant Maxwell again indicated
that he understood the potential conflicts of interest raised by the
retainer agreement but wished his present counsel to continue to
represent him. Despite the defendant's requests, the trial court
which are adverse to Maxwell's interests as a result of this agreement. The Law-
yers affirm that they will not be influenced in any way by any interest which
may be adverse to that of Maxwell. The Lawyers will raise every defense which
they, in their best judgment based upon their experience feel is warranted by the
evidence and information at their disposal and which, taking into consideration
the flow of the trial and trial tactics, is in Maxwell's best interests. The Lawyers
will conduct all aspects of the defense of Maxwell as would a reasonable compe-
tent attorney acting as a diligent, conscientious advocate.
Id.
26. See supra text accompanying note 25. The contract included provisions designed to
ensure counsel's right to receive and exploit confidential material about petitioner's life. In
paragraph 37, Maxwell agreed to waive, on counsel's demand, his attorney-client privilege
and "any and all other privileges and rights which would prevent the full and complete
exercise" of counsel's interests. In paragraph 33 he promised to (1) give counsel all materials
he has "pertaining to [his] life and experiences," (2) use his best efforts to obtain and turn
over such inaterials in the hands of others, and (3) "confer with [counsel] . . . as often as
[they] shall reasonably require so as to enable [them] to elicit from [him] all details" of his
life. Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 610 n.1, 639 P.2d. at 250 n.1, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179 n.1.
27. Maxwell's attorneys contended that this contract complied with Rule 5-101 of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 5-101 requires any attorney acquiring a pe-
cuniary interest adverse to his client to meet the following requirements: (1) full disclosure
of the interest to the client in writing (provided the terms are fair and reasonable to the
client); (2) the client must be given the opportunity to seek advice of independent counsel;
and (3) the client's consent in writing must be obtained. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 501
(West 1981). The Maxwell court ruled that the agreement could not be considered "fair and
reasonable" to the interests of the client.
28. The court also believed that the advance waiver of the attorney-client privilege vio-
lated the requirements of Rule 5-101 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. 161
Cal. Rptr. at 852.
PUBLICATION RIGHTS
ruled that the retainer agreement created conflicts of interest so
serious as to deprive the defendant of the effective assistance of
counsel.2 Defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the
California Supreme Court contesting the court's removal of his pri-
vate counsel. The supreme court transferred the proceedings to the
court of appeal which affirmed the trial court's order.
The California Supreme Court subsequently vacated the trial
court's order recusing Maxwell's private attorneys.", In doing so,
the court stated, "[t]he mere possibility of a conflict does not war-
rant pretrial removal of competent counsel in a criminal case over
defendant's informed objection."3 1 The supreme court held that
Maxwell had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the poten-
tial conflicts of interest.
The Maxwell decisions raise for discussion the weight and im-
pact courts should afford the ABA's pronouncement of ethical
standards,32 the appropriate standards for determining ineffective
assistance of counsel, and the degree to which the judiciary can
encroach upon a criminal defendant's right to counsel of his choice.
The court of appeal examined these concerns through careful scru-
tiny of the circumstances before it and the needs of the defendant
and the judicial system, 3 while the California Supreme Court, in
reversing the court of appeal, focused narrowly on the defendant's
right to counsel of his choice. The supreme court held that: "When
the possibility of significant conflict has been brought to the
court's attention and the danger of proceeding with chosen counsel
has been disclosed generally to the defendant, he may insist on
retaining his attorneys if he waives the conflict knowingly and in-
telligently for purposes of the criminal trial."3"
29. Id.
30. 30 Cal. 3d at 620, 639 P.2d at 255-56, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185 (1982).
31. Id. at 619 n.10, 639 P.2d at 256 n.10, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185 n.10.
32. See supra note 11.
33. Maxwell, citing Faretta v. State of California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), argued that he
had an absolute right to represent himself and, by analogy, an absolute right to counsel of
his choice. The court, however, refused to accept this analogy, relying on the distinction that
self-representation precludes the possibility of a sixth amendment ineffective counsel appeal
whereas exercise of one's right to choice of counsel does not. 161 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58. The
California Supreme Court allowed Maxwell to exercise the claimed absolute right to choice
of counsel.
34. 30 Cal. 3d at 623, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187. The impact of this "know-




The court of appeal, in upholding the trial judge's order recus-
ing Maxwell's attorney, based its decision upon the California case
of People v. Corona.5 In Corona, the defendant filed a petition for
habeas corpus seeking review of his conviction for twenty-five
counts of first degree murder. The petitioner claimed he had been
deprived of effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth
and fourteenth amendments.36 Corona had been represented by at-
torney Richard Hawk. In return for his services, Hawk received ex-
clusive literary and dramatic rights to the defendant's life story,
including his criminal prosecution. Corona was also required to
waive his attorney-client privilege. Even before the commencement
of trial, Hawk hired a professional writer and entered into a book
contract with MacMillan Publishing Company. 37 At trial, the pros-
ecution produced more than one hundred witnesses, while defense
counsel failed to call a single witness and never raised the defenses
of mental incompetence, diminished capacity, or legal insanity.38
Corona's appeal alleged a denial of effective assistance of
counsel based upon Hawk's incompetence as well as the conflict of
interest created by the literary retainer agreement. Corona asked
the court to rule that his representation was ineffective, as re-
quired by the sixth and fourteenth amendments, either per se or
through a showing of prejudice.3 9 The court stated:
When a conflict is validly waived, defendant may still argue on appeal that
he received ineffective assistance for reasons unrelated to the conflict. Because of
the difficulty of isolating errors motivated by conflicts and because defendant
has created the problem by his knowing insistence on conflicted counsel, the
burden should be on him to show that deficiencies he later asserts did not arise
from the conflict.
30 Cal. 3d at 620 n.11, 639 P.2d at 256 n.11, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 177 n..
35. 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978). Juan Corona was found guilty of
murder on retrial in 1982.
36. See supra note 12.
37. The book, entitled BURDEN OF PROOF, THE CASE OF JUAN CORONA, authored by Ed
Cray and supplemented by Hawk's afterword, was published in 1973, just a few months
after the completion of the trial.
38. The twenty-five victims had all been killed with a bolo machete. There was some
indication that the crimes were sexually motivated. Hawk was aware of the defendant's past
history of mental illness, yet failed to inquire as to the defendant's mental competence.
Perhaps he was concerned with the validity of the contract entered into between himself
and Corona should an insanity defense be accepted by the court. The possibility of the
mental incapacity of the defendant to enter into a legally binding contract was also recog-
nized by Maxwell's attorneys. See supra note 25, subd. (b). Note that the standards for
determining legal sanity in a civil case are not the same as in a criminal case.
39. The court recognized rulings by a minority of courts which have held that divided
490 [Vol. 31
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The case at bench, however, meets both of the aforementioned criteria. One,
it is indisputable that by entering into a literary rights contract, trial counsel
created a situation which prevented him from devoting the requisite undi-
vided loyalty and service to his client. From that moment on, the trial coun-
sel was devoted to two masters with conflicting interests-he was forced to
choose between his own pocketbook and the best interests of his client, the
accused. Two, the record, as a whole, abundantly demonstrates that the con-
flict of interests unanimously condemned by the case law and proscribed by
the canon of ethics resulted in obvious prejudice to appellant... 10
The Corona court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
The judiciary has been continually groping for the appropriate
standard to apply when faced with such conflict of interest claims.
In two other cases, Ray v. Rose41 and People v. Fuller,42 the courts
required the defendant to show that the literary rights retainer
agreement created a conflict of interest between the attorney and
the defendant and that the conflict actually prejudiced the defen-
dant's case. In Ray v. Rose, James Earl Ray alleged that the
financial interest of his attorney in the publication rights of Ray's
story created a conflict of interest that rendered his counsel inef-
fective and induced his attorney to coerce Ray into pleading guilty
to the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.43 Ray filed a petition
loyalties constitute denial of effective representation as a matter of law. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974); Goodson v.
Peyton, 351 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1965); Zurita v. United States, 410 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1969);
People v. Richardson, 7 11l. App. 3d 367, 287 N.E.2d 517 (1972); People v. Stoval, 40 IlI. 2d
109, 239 N.E.2d 441 (1968).
40. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
41. 491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
42. 21 IMI. App. 3d 437, 315 N.E.2d 687 (1974), petition for writ of habeas corpus de-
nied, 421 F. Supp. 582 (1976).
43. Foreman wrote Ray two letters the day before Ray was scheduled to plead guilty.
The first one contained the following references to the literary rights contract:
You have heretofore assigned to me all of your royalties from magazine arti-
cles, book, motion picture or other revenue to be derived from the writings of
Wm. Bradford Huie. These are my own property unconditionally.
If the [guilty] plea is entered and the sentence is accepted and no embarrass-
ing circumstances take place in the court room, I am willing to assign to any
bank, trust company or individual selected by you all my receipts in excess of
$165,000. These funds over and above the first $165,000 will be held by such
bank, trust company or individual subject to your order.
491 F.2d at 291.
The second letter referred to a cash advance by Foreman to Ray's brother upon Ray's
request in the sum of $500. "And this advance, also, is contingent upon the plea of guilty
and sentence going through on March 10, 1969, without any unseemly conduct on your part
in court." Id. at 291-92.
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for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging constitutional violations. His
request for an evidentiary hearing was originally denied," but was
later granted. 45 An evidentiary hearing was held at which the court
found no factual basis to support the allegations that the criminal
defendant was actually prejudiced by his attorney's actions.
40
Among the facts presented were the following alleged improprieties
committed by the defendant's attorney: a refusal to hire an investi-
gator and, instead, allowing a writer involved in the publication
contract to conduct the investigation; a refusal to allow Ray to
take the stand at trial;47 and, a refusal to seek a continuance due to
adverse publicity because the book contract called for the case to
go to trial within a certain time period. In dismissing Ray's asser-
tions, the court focused on the economics of the situation and
noted that Ray's guilty plea greatly reduced the value of the publi-
cation rights.
In discussing the issue of effective counsel, the Ray court
stated that the contractual arrangement was "a violation of the
Disciplinary Rule 5-104(B) of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility of the ABA, which was adopted after Ray entered his plea.
Despite our disapproval of such a fee arrangement, however, its
existence does not necessarily mean that Ray was denied effective
assistance of counsel.' 4 It was held that Ray had not sustained the
burden of showing actual prejudice arising from the conflict of in-
44. 373 F. Supp. 687 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
45. 491 F.2d 285.
46. While Ray was awaiting extradition in England, he contacted attorney Arthur
Hanes of Alabama and asked him to represent him. Before Hanes visited Ray, he was ap-
proached by a writer, William Bradford Huie, about the possibility of Ray selling his story.
On Hanes' advice Ray signed two agreements, one of which gave Hanes complete power of
attorney, the other assigning Hanes 40% of all monies that Ray would receive as a result of
the subsequent agreement with Huie. A subsequent agreement was reached whereby Huie
was given exclusive rights to receive information on Ray's participation in the King as-
sasination, for which Ray and Hanes would each receive 30% of the gross receipts of all
literary works. Later Ray fired Hanes and hired Percy Foreman. At first Foreman took the
position that he would not get involved with any literary rights contract until after trial.
However, within two months Ray assigned all of his rights in the Huie proceeds to Foreman.
535 F.2d at 969, 970.
47. Ray thought that at trial it would be necessary for him to take the stand in his own
defense so that he could explain his actions on the day of the murder. This idea was rejected
by Hanes and Huie. Hanes allegedly said, "Why give testimony away when we can sell it."
491 F.2d at 287.
48. 535 F.2d at 974.
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terest.49 In searching for prejudice, the court ruled out the exis-
tence of a prejudicial effect due to the book contract, since Ray
had pleaded guilty, and did not address the issue of possible
prejudice had Ray gone to trial. The court continued to rely on
Ray's attorney's assertion that he had not been influenced by the
book contract and that he would have made more money from the
contract if Ray had gone to trial.50
In People v. Fuller,"1 the Appellate Court of Illinois refused to
apply a per se rule of reversal in a conflict of interest case arising
out of a literary rights retainer agreement. At the time this case
arose, Illinois had generally adhered to a per se rule that did not
require a showing of prejudice and mandated reversal of a criminal
conviction if the defendant could show an actual conflict of inter-
est existed between the defendant and his attorney at the time of
trial.52 The Fuller court chose to narrow the application of this per
se rule to those situations in which the attorney's conflict of inter-
est arises from a commitment to a third party, and not to himself.
The dissent in Fuller noted that the distinction between an
attorney's commitment to his own advantage and an attorney's
commitment to a third party's advantage did not support the re-
jection of the per se rule in this context. The dissent could discover
no rational reason for imposing different standards of review for a
conflict of interest in relation to a literary rights retainer agree-
ment and a conflict of interest due to a commitment to a third
party.
In following the state appellate court's decision, the United
States District Court 5s seemed to justify the rejection of the per se
rule by relying on the unique facts of the Fuller case. Throughout
the course of the criminal proceedings, the defendant had been
represented by both William Cherikos, a public defender, and
Whitney Hardy, a private attorney appointed as co-counsel. Hardy
obtained beneficial ownership in the publication rights relating to
49. Id. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942), which required a showing of actual prejudice.
50. The court did note that had the sale of Ray's story been profitable, Foreman's fee
of $165,000 would have been unconscionable. 392 F. Supp. 601, 607 (W.D. Tenn. 1974). See
infra text accompanying note 71.
51. 21 Ill. App. 3d 437, 315 N.E.2d 687 (1974), petition for writ of habeas corpus de-
nied, 421 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Ill. 1976).
52. People v. Stoval, 40 L 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441 (1968).
53. 421 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. IM. 1976).
1982] 493
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Fuller's life story and criminal prosecution. This contract was later
terminated upon the defendant's request. The termination of the
literary rights contract, however, occurred after the defendant had
pleaded guilty. In order to support its finding that Fuller had not
been denied effective assistance of counsel, the court felt com-
pelled to point to the competent involvement of Cherikos, who had
no interest in the publication rights. The court stated:
It is unquestionably true that the contractual agreement involving the Peti-
tioner, his parents, and Hardy placed Hardy in a potential conflict of interest
situation. However, despite the repeated disapproval of such contracts by
both the bench and bar, evidence of the existence of the contract alone is
insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. It is significant to note
from the time of his arrest to the time of his sentencing, Petitioner was repre-
sented by Cherikos against whom no allegations of impropriety are directed .'
The court also noted that Fuller failed to contend that an actual
conflict of interest had existed between himself and Hardy, that
Hardy's representation was incompetent, or that his plea had been
coerced. The court seemed to differentiate vaguely between not
having to prove prejudice and not, at least, alleging prejudice.55
In United States v. Hearst,5 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was required to establish
the existence of an actual conflict of interest at trial which had an
adverse effect on the adequacy of representation in order to sup-
port a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This test, derived
from the Supreme Court's decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan,57 reduced
the defendant's burden from a showing of prejudice to a showing
of adverse effect.58
54. Id. at 585.
55. Id. at 584. The district court noted the following statement of the Illinois appellate
court-
It is as important to recognize what the defendant does not claim as it is to
realize that which he does contend. He does not contend that attorney Cherikos
had any conflict of interest or that his representation was anything other than
competent .... He does not contend that his plea was coerced, that the taking
of the plea was involuntary in any sense, or that any constitutional infirmity of
any sort surrounded the taking of the plea or the decision to plead, nor does he
urge any constitutional deprivations obtaining prior to or after arrest.
Id.
56. 466 F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980).
57. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Cuyler involved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based
upon a conflict of interest due to multiple representation.
58. A showing of adverse effect is an easier standard for a petitioner to meet. The re-
quirement of prejudice demanded a concrete showing of an error that significantly altered
494 [Vol. 31
PUBLICATION RIGHTS
The defendant in Hearst alleged that "in order to remove vast
areas of her story from the attorney-client privilege, and to
heighten public attention to her trial, defense counsel demanded
that she take the stand to testify, even though he realized that her
repeated invocation of the fifth amendment would ultimately
doom her cause." ' She contended that this decision, by her attor-
ney, F. Lee Bailey, was made with his personal benefit in mind,
rather than her best interests. While not condoning the existence
of literary retainer agreements, the court ruled that the defendant
did not state a claim for relief absent a showing of prejudice. On
appeal, the court of appeals applied the Cuyler test and remanded
the case for the purpose of determining whether F. Lee Bailey pur-
sued his own interests at the expense of his client's and whether
that pursuit adversely effected the quality of his representation.6
II. ABUSES OF PUBLICATION RIGHTS RETAINER AGREEMENTS
The abuses that have developed from literary retainer agree-
ments have been numerous. They range from distortion of the
traditional attorney-client relationship to the semblance of a con-
tingent fee in criminal cases. The potential influence on the attor-
ney cannot be assessed, nor can the resulting effect on his client.
Frequently, the literary retainer agreement requires the defen-
dant to waive his attorney-client privilege in advance of trial. Any
information that the defendant discloses to his attorney then be-
comes subject to publication regardless of the nature of that infor-
mation."' In People v. Corona, the book involved was published a
the outcome of the trial: "For example, overwhelming evidence of guilt might make almost
impossible a showing that a relatively minor error resulted in actual prejudice. But such
evidence would be completely irrelevant to an inquiry whether the same error, if caused by
an actual conflict of interest, showed an adverse effect on counsel's performance." United
States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d at 1194. See also Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
1978).
59. 466 F. Supp. at 1083. Patty Hearst agreed not to publish any account of her ordeal
until a certain period after the release of Bailey's book. Bailey's book was rejected by the
publisher and Ms. Hearst was released from this agreement. Id.
60. The results of this evidentiary hearing have not yet been reported. The court of
appeals did suggest that the district court issue an order to F. Lee Bailey "to show cause
why he should not be disciplined ... in his capacity as a member pro hac vice of the bar of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California." 638 F.2d at 1199.
61. Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 30 Cal. 3d at 610, 639 P.2d at
248, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (1982). Maxwell waived all defamation and invasion-of-privacy
claims against his counsel which might arise from the literary contract.
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few months after the completion of trial and before appeal was
perfected.6 2 A similar occurrence may arise out of the Maxwell
agreement since the contract makes no reference to representation
by his attorneys for an appeal of a conviction. 3
This waiver of the attorney-client privilege may do no more
than distort the traditional view of the attorney-client relationship.
Yet, it evokes an atmosphere in which the attorney is not function-
ing solely as an attorney. Instead, he is motivated to plan the pub-
lication and promotion of a book or movie as well as to represent
his client. There is also the possibility that the immediate publica-
tion of a book could affect later judicial proceedings. Certainly, a
prosecutor reading such a book could gain insight into the defen-
dant's case and thereby enhance the possibility of conviction or the
affirmance of a conviction."
The potential for financial benefit can also lead an attorney to
coerce a defendant to plead guilty. James Earl Ray alleged his
family was offered money to discourage Ray from going to trial and
testifying. In Woftowicz v. U.S.,6 5 the defendant alleged his guilty
plea was involuntary because of coercion by his family members
and the promise of a lenient sentence from his attorney. The de-
62. See supra note 37.
63. Justice Richardson of the California Supreme Court, dissenting, recognized this
possibility in the Maxwell case. 30 Cal.3d at 625, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
Finally, another inescapable fact remains-attorneys have agreed to represent
Maxwell only during trial. What is to prevent them from publicly utilizing every
bit of information that they have gleaned during trial preparation and trial at
the same time that defendant is appealing from a judgment of conviction? The
appellate briefs of the second attorney may be filed simultaneously with a book
of the first attorneys aimed at the best seller list. Aside from the profound impli-
cations such a situation would have for the judicial system in general, what is
there to protect defendant's rights during the appellate process and any subse-
quent retrial? At that point he will no longer be the "owner" of his life story,
which will instead be in the hands of his former attorneys whose only remaining
interest may be the promotion of sales.
64. California Supreme Court Chief Justice Bird, in his concurring and dissenting opin-
ion, posited one such consequence to this type of literary contract.
To one trained in law, a host of legal problems come easily to mind. Suppose,
for example, that petitioner is convicted, but the conviction is reversed on ap-
peal and remanded for retrial. Under the terms of the agreement, these counsel
are not obligated to represent him at any stage beyond the present superior
court proceddings. If they decide not to represent him in the retrial proceedings,
they may demand that he waive his privilege prior to the retrial.
30 Cal. 3d 606, 625, 639 P.2d 248, 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 189 (Bird, J., concurring and
dissenting).
65. 550 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1977).
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fendant's attorney had negotiated a contract for movie rights. The
resulting proceeds were, in part, to pay for attorney's fees.6  The
defendant stated he had pleaded guilty to receive contract money
to finance a sex change operation for his male paramour. The court
rejected defendant's conflict of interest allegation, but granted an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant had been
competent at the time of sentencing.
Justice Richardson of the California Supreme Court, dissent-
ing in Maxwell, argued that the terms of the literary contract con-
tained both the reality and appearance of fatally conflicting inter-
ests. Justice Richardson elaborated on the scope of the conflicts of
interest inherent in literary retainer agreements, particularly in
considering tactical decisions which may confront trial counsel.
Suppose that before trial, through a plea bargain, defendant's life may be
saved by an informed entry of a guilty plea to certain of the multiple counts,
including murder, with which he is charged. Should counsel recommend such
a bargain? Perhaps they should, but would they, knowing that the sales value
of a book or television manuscript would decline if there was no dramatic
trial testimony elicited? How really objective will counsel be in exploring the
opportunities for avoiding trial without any attendant publicity if the com-
mercial value of defendant's life story is thereby reduced or destroyed? If
defendant is tried, should he be called as a witness to tell his "story," or
exercise his constitutional right to remain silent, thereby putting "the prose-
cution to its proof"? Surely, the sales value of defendant's story would be
affected by the decision. If defendant takes the stand during trial would the
areas of his direct examination be affected, however subtly, perhaps unknow-
ingly, by counsel's financial interest in the drama and saleability of his testi-
mony? As anticipated in paragraph 14(b), would the existence of the contract
affect a decision to assert an insanity defense with its inherent threat to the
validity of the agreement?67
In addition to creating a situation in which attorney and client
have competing interests, literary retainer agreements also violate
public policy by allowing an attorney to enter into an arrangement
for what is essentially a contingent fee for representing a defen-
dant in a criminal case. 8 Contingent fees in criminal cases are pro-
hibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. 9 Literary retainer agreements are
not contingent in the usual sense as relating to the success or fail-
66. Defendant's story appeared in dramatic form in the movie "Dog Day Afternoon."
67. 30 Cal. 3d at 629, 639 P.2d at 262, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
68. See MODEL CODE Canon 2 n.30.
69. Id. at DR 2-106(C); MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.5(c).
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ure of the litigation. However, the attorney's fee is contingent upon
the success of the book or movie, which may be affected by the
outcome of the criminal prosecution.
In Ray v. Rose, the Tennessee District Court, after an eviden-
tiary hearing granted to James Earl Ray on his sixth amendment
ineffective counsel claim, characterized the attorney's fee as con-
tingent°.7 The court went on to indicate that had Ray's attorney
received the $150,000 called for in the literary contract "the fee
would have been unreasonable. . . . [I]t would have been subject to
an attack limiting the amount of the fee to a recovery based upon
a quantum meruit."7' In a separate action, Ray sought preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief against his attorney's further dis-
closure of facts surrounding the King assassination and declaratory
judgment rendering the several contracts null and void.72 The gra-
vamen of Ray's complaint was an alleged conspiracy to deprive
him of his civil rights. The court in dismissing Ray's allegation
noted:
We need not decide the interesting question whether, under Tennessee law,
contracts, of the kind involved here, are void as a matter of public policy on
the grounds that they tend to create conflicts of interest between attorney
and client and tend to create incentives to undermine the judicial process
itself because of the publicity value of sensational tactics and disruptions of
trials73
On their face, literary retainer agreements appear contrary to
public policy. The attorney's financial rewards are totally unre-
lated to the quality of his services and the amount of time he has
spent on the case. The defense attorney is not compensated in pro-
portion to his efforts, but rather is compensated in proportion to
the heinous nature of his client's alleged crime. That inherent
character of these contracts, along with the other numerous abuses
that have occurred and continue to occur, establishes the need for
the control or elimination of literary retainer agreements.
III. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REvIEw: MAXWELL AND HEARST
The most recent decision concerning literary retainer agree-
70. 392 F. Supp. 601, 615 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
71. Id. at 620.
72. Ray v. Foreman, 441 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1971).
73. Id. at 1267.
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ments is Maxwell,7 4 where the California Supreme Court chose to
allow Maxwell to "knowingly and intelligently" waive the conflicts
created by the retainer agreement.75 In so holding, the court failed
to discuss the potential harm to the defendant or the ethical
problems raised by these contracts. The court-elevated the right of
a defendant to retain counsel of his choice over sixth amendment
concerns for the effective assistance of counsel and the integrity of
the judicial system and the legal profession.
By examining the court of appeal decision in Maxwell 8 in
conjunction with the Hearst" decision, it becomes apparent that
the courts should address the propriety of these literary retainer
agreements and the many problems that ensue when such a con-
tract exists. The practical and ethical difficulties that arise cannot
be resolved by a summary decision that ignores these underlying
issues by characterizing a defendant's waiver as "knowing and
voluntary.
'78
Maxwell addresses the propriety of these agreements before
trial begins, when a conflict of interest indeed exists and when
there is only a potential for adverse effect. Hearst addresses the
problem after trial and, applying Cuyler v. Sullivan,79 requires the
defendant to show that the defense attorney's performance was ad-
versely affected by the conflict of interest. While these decisions
may appear to be contradictory, a closer examination reveals that
they can be factually and theoretically reconciled.
Cuyler v. Sullivan stated that "the possibility of conflict is in-
sufficient to impugn a criminal conviction." 80 A defendant is not to
be allowed to engage in a speculative search for a reason for rever-
sal without some support of his or her contentions. With the trial
court's record before it, the Hearst court required the defendant to
show that the conflict of interest and potential for harm inherent
in these agreements actually crystallized at trial. However, a retro-
spective requirement that a defendant show an adverse effect does
not prohibit a court, as in Maxwell, from noting the existence of a
74. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
75. Id. at 621, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
76. 161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1978).
77. 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980).
78. 30 Cal. 3d at 621, 634, 639 P.2d at 257, 264-65, 180 Cal. Rptr. 186, 194. See supra
note 34.
79. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
80. Id. at 350.
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literary rights contract in advance of trial. The court should then
consider the high probability of a prejudicial influence on a defense
attorney, and may conclude, in the interests of the defendant and
the judicial system, that such an attorney-client relationship
should not be allowed.
In considering the potential for harm to the defendant, the
Maxwell court of appeal noted, "[i]t is the reasonable probability
of such inherently pervasive conflicts of interest-necessarily in-
volved in the kind of retainer agreement that exists in the instant
case-that precludes the agreement from being considered 'fair
and reasonable' to a client. ... 8sThe court determined that the
great potential for unfairness to the defendant as well as the integ-
rity of the judicial process warranted the removal of defense coun-
sel against defendant's wishes. Maxwell argued that the removal of
the attorney of his choice would violate his constitutional rights.
The court refused to allow Maxwell to assert his right to counsel of
his choice when that choice would undermine his sixth amendment
right to effective counsel.
It is our conclusion that the inherent nature of the retainer agreement before
us negates the existence of Maxwell's constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel by reason of the constitutional requirement that "the ser-
vices of the attorney be devoted solely to the interest of his client undimin-
ished by conflicting consideration." A conflict of interest which arises from
the fee interest of the retainer agreement here is so inherently conducive to
divided loyalties as to amount to a denial of the right to effective representa-
tion as a matter of law.s
The court of appeal held that the right to counsel of one's
choice must yield to considerations of ethics and preservation of
the integrity of the judicial process.83 The rights of the defendant
must be balanced against other principles inherent in the judicial
system. In these literary rights retainer cases, courts must: (1) pro-
tect the defendant from the possible consequences of his own deci-
sion; (2) consider the interests of the public in the judicial system;
and (3) exercise the necessary discretion to control the conduct of
attorneys. The Maxwell court considered these factors and
concluded:
81. 161 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
82. Id. at 856 (citation omitted).
83. See Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. App. 3d 906, 576
P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1979).
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In light of the retainer agreement executed by Maxwell and his law-
yers-which can only be described as unconscionable and outrageous-it
would constitute a substantial contribution to the utter prostration and mal-
functioning of our criminal justice system to permit these lawyers to re-
present Maxwell at his forthcoming trial."
The California Supreme Court failed to look beyond Maxwell's
waiver to the inherent conflict of interest created by the literary
retainer agreement. The court concluded that "the mere possibility
of a conflict does not warrant pretrial removal of competent coun-
sel in a criminal case over defendant's informed objection."' 5 How-
ever, the conflict of interest and its resulting effect cannot accu-
rately be characterized as a "mere possibility of conflict."86 These
retainer agreements impinge upon the quality of justice and distort
the attorney-client relationship.
IV. PER SE RULES OF DISQUALIFICATION
The court of appeal in Maxwell ruled that the retainer agree-
ment entered into between the defendant and his attorney
amounted to a denial of the defendant's right to effective represen-
tation as a matter of law. A per se rule of disqualification would
eliminate literary retainer agreements by recusing any defense at-
torney who was involved in such a contract. Disqualification is the
only appropriate remedy for the problems created by literary re-
tainer agreements."'
Per se rules of disqualification have often been enforced in re-
lation to violations of Canon Nine and Canon Five of the Profes-
sional Code of Responsibility. Canon Nine88 deals with the appear-
ance of professional impropriety on behalf of an attorney. This
84. Maxwell, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
85. 30 Cal. 3d at 619, 639 P.2d at 255-56, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
86. Id. at 619, 639 P.2d at 255-56, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
87. Chief Justice Bird would probably find a per se rule of disqualification to be unduly
restrictive of an indigent defendant's right to secure counsel of his choice. In dissenting and
concurring in Maxwell, Bird stated, "For this court to hold any 'life story' agreement, re-
gardless of its contents, impermissible would be to foreclose to the indigent perhaps the only
opportunity he may have to secure counsel of his choice." Id. at 624, 639 P.2d at 259, 180
Cal. Rptr. at 188 (1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). This statement overlooks
the possibility of an indigent defendant retaining a separate attorney to handle literary con-
tract rights with a percentage of the proceeds going to the defense attorney, or other similar
alternatives. See infra Section V of text.




Canon has been the basis for a per se rule of disqualification in
denying approval of counsel for a class action. 9 In Kramer v. Sci-
entific Control Corp.,90 the court required the removal of a law
firm representing plaintiffs in a class action on the mere appear-
ance of impropriety. The court in Zyistra v. Safeway Stores,
Inc.,9 1 also imposed a per se rule of disqualification in disallowing
an attorney from serving as counsel in a class action where his wife
and law partners were members of the class of plaintiffs. The court
stated:
[Wlhenever an attorney is confronted with a potential for choosing between
actions which may benefit himself financially and an action which may bene-
fit the class which he represents there is a reasonable possibility that some
specifically identifiable impropriety will occur. Furthermore, the public suspi-
cion of such a conflict is sure to outweigh any public benefit from having the
attorney continue.
92
The tendency of courts to avoid application of per se rules
fashioned from the concerns reflected in the Code is based on a
fear of possible abuse by those wishing to hinder their opponent's
case by seeking disqualification of opposing counsel. In Interna-
tional Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer,e a retired attorney, a defen-
dant in a shareholder case, hired members of his old firm to re-
present him. The plaintiff moved for disqualification of the firm
representing the defendant since the defendant would be called as
a witness in violation of Canon Five."4 The court cited the Con-
necticut Bar Association amici curiae brief in rejecting plaintiffs'
request.
It behooves this court, therefore, while mindful of the existing Code, to ex-
amine afresh the problems sought to be met by that Code, to weigh for itself
what those problems are, how real in the practical world they are in fact, and
89. It must be noted that approval of an attorney to represent a class is governed by
specific requirements as established by Rule 23 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 23 encourages close scrutiny of the attorney-class relationship by the court. The exis-
tence of a literary retainer agreement should also evoke close scrutiny by the courts.
90. 534 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
91. 578 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. Id. at 104.
93. 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975).
94. Id. at 1290-91. The plaintiff asserted representation of the defendant by his law
partners would violate DR 5-101(B), 5-102(A), 5-105(A) and 5-105(B) of the MODEL CODE.
DR 5-101 reads in part: "(B) A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or
pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be
called as a witness .... ." MODEL CODE DR 5-101 (emphasis added).
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whether a mechanical and didactic application of the Code to all situations
automatically might not be productive of more harm than good, by requiring
the client and the judicial system to sacrifice more than the value of the pre-
sumed benefits.9
5
The application of a per se rule of disqualification of any at-
torney who enters into a literary contract with a criminal defen-
dant would not be "productive of more harm than good."9 The
application of such a rule would not lend itself to the possibility
for abuse apparent in other per se situations. The potential for
abuse as a delay tactic or to hinder the development of the oppo-
nent's case would not come into play in a criminal case.97 The fac-
tual circumstances behind these literary rights contracts and the
problems associated with them are sufficiently uniform so as to al-
low a blanket rejection of these agreements.
Per se disqualification in advance of trial based upon ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel would greatly deter attorneys from enter-
ing into these agreements. If it were known that disqualification
would result immediately upon discovery of this attorney-client re-
lationship, the potential for financial gain would be reduced. Any
attorney who entered into a literary retainer agreement would be
risking discovery and disqualification nullifying the value of his
contract rights. Discovery of these agreements would not be diffi-
cult. Only the more sensationalized crimes which captivate the
public's attention lend themselves to the establishment of a liter-
ary rights contract. In appropriate cases, the courts would be ex-
pected to take it upon themselves to question the defendant and
his attorney to determine if such an agreement exists. The prose-
cutor could also assume some responsibility in requesting the court
to make such an inquiry.
Per se disqualification in advance of trial protects the rights of
the defendant and the interests of the public as well as eliminating
the burden of such a conffict on an attorney. The inherent conflict
of interest created by such a retainer agreement should not be al-
lowed to manifest itself in the attorney-client relationship and al-
95. 527 F.2d at 1293.
96. Id.
97. A prosecutor is bound by certain time considerations (e.g., the defendant's sixth
amendment speedy trial rights) which could conflict with such delay. Additionally, criminal
defendants are more likely to seek delay themselves. Such tactical maneuvers are recognized
means of encouraging settlement, delaying the litigation process, or instigating the removal
of an opponent's (learned) counsel in civil cases.
1982] 503
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ter the defendant's right to effective counsel. These agreements
provide little if any benefit and may improperly shape the attor-
ney-client relationship.
V. OTHER PossmLE SOLUTIONS
The California Supreme Court decision in Maxwell may fore-
stall the application of a per se rule of disqualification where a lit-
erary retainer agreement exists. There are, however, other alterna-
tives which may eliminate these agreements or reduce their
potential harm. The alternatives can be effectuated by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, the legal profession itself, or the legislature.
The continual violation of DR 5-104(B) by attorneys should
encourage the American Bar Association to take a stance against
the existence of these agreements. The purpose and legitimacy of a
code of ethics is placed in question when blatant violations con-
tinue without disciplinary sanctions. Disciplinary action should be
instituted against violating attorneys"B and the consequences ought
to be harsh enough to deter attorneys from entering into these
agreements. If the American Bar Association is not willing to en-
force its standards, there is little likelihood that the courts will do
SO.
The attorney who enters into a literary retainer agreement can
reduce the inherent conflict of interest by involving an indepen-
dent attorney to handle the publication rights." This would allow
the defense attorney to receive a set fee and concentrate solely
upon the interests of his client. While this would not eliminate all
of the evils associated with these agreements, it would serve to re-
duce the possible adverse effect upon the quality of the attorney's
representation.
The contracting attorney should also clearly inform his client
of the potential conflicts of interest that may arise. A framework
for providing such notice is found in Rule 5-101 of the California
Rules of Professional Conduct-Avoiding Adverse Interests. Rule
5-101 allows an attorney to acquire an interest adverse to his cli-
ent's interest if: there is full disclosure to the client in writing (pro-
98. See supra note 11.
99. Lawyers for Atlanta slayer Wayne B. Williams, Jr. indicated that they would not
participate in any negotiations over the sale of the defendant's life story and planned to hire
another attorney to represent the accused killer for that purpose. Nat'l L.J., Monday, Aug.
24, 1981, at 1.
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vided the transaction and terms are fair and reasonable); the client
is given a reasonable opportunity to seek advice of independent
counsel; and the client's consent is in writing.100 Ideally, the attor-
ney should require that his client consult independent counsel and
allow that independent counsel to handle all publication contracts.
Finally, many state legislatures have acted to restrict the abil-
ity of a criminal defendant to enter into a literary retainer agree-
ment with an attorney. The first state to enact such legislation was
New York with its so-called Son of Sam Law.10 1 This law requires
that any monies received by a criminal defendant arising from the
sale of publication rights be paid over to the Crime Victims Com-
pensation Board.10 2 The money is placed in an escrow account for a
period of five years during which victims or their legal representa-
tives can seek a civil judgment against the criminal.103
The New York statute, § 632-a Executive Law-Distribution
of Moneys Received as a Result of the Commission of Crime, al-
lows one-fifth of the amount in escrow to be paid for legal fees.
4T
However, subdivision (9) states:
Any action taken by any person accused or convicted of a crime, whether by
way of execution of a power of attorney, creation of corporate entities or oth-
erwise, to defeat the purpose of this section shall be null and void as against
the public policy of this state.105
This subdivision appears to prohibit the existence of a separate
literary retainer agreement between the attorney and defendant
since it would "defeat the purpose of this section."108
100. See supra note 27.
101. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1977). Many people have questioned the con-
stitutionality of such statutes as possibly violating the defendant's first amendment right to
express his views and depriving the defendant of property without due process of law. See
Comment, Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victim's Rights v. Freedom of Speech, 54 IND. L.J.
443 (1978).
102. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1977).
103. Id. Federal legislation to encourage all states to adopt Son-of-Sam laws was intro-
duced in 1981 before both the House and Senate judiciary committees. Lieberman & Stew-
art, Making Money Off Murder, STUDENT LAwYER, Feb., 1982, at 23.
104. N.Y. Exac. LAw § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1977).
105. Id. at § 632-a(9).
106. See id. A separate media rights contract between an attorney and his client would
be an attempt to circumvent this statute. The statute prescribes the proportion of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of publication rights available for legal fees. Any contract granting an




The stringency of the "adverse effect" requirement imposed in
United States v. Hearst has yet to be determined. Regardless of
the burden of proof required, a per se rule would eventually serve
to eliminate the need to adjudicate the propriety of a literary re-
tainer agreement in retrospect. Enforcement of a per se rule of dis-
qualification in this area would discourage attorneys from creating
such contracts and would also lead to the discovery of these fee
arrangements during the course of judicial proceedings. In light of
the Supreme Court's stance in Cuyler v. Sullivan, there seems to
be no constitutional mandate for a per se rule requiring reversal of
a conviction where a literary rights agreement exists.10 7 However,
Cuyler does not prohibit courts or states from affirmatively formu-
lating steps that eliminate these agreements.
The nature of these literary retainer agreements places a de-
fense attorney in the precarious situation of having to ignore the
temptation of financial gain in favor of his client's best interests. A
per se rule of disqualification does not imply that only unethical
attorneys enter into these agreements. Rather, the per se rule elim-
inates the possibility of unethical behavior in a situation where it
is likely to occur. It is too difficult to determine if an attorney was,
consciously or subconsciously, compelled toward personal financial
gain to his client's detriment. Alternatively, no one can say that
such an agreement will alter the quality of the attorney's represen-
tation. Yet the cases discussed above do not reflect well upon the
legal profession. The claims of the defendants in these cases may
not have satisfied the legal criteria for reversal, but each raised for
examination questionable behavior by attorneys.
The necessity for a per se rule of disqualification before trial,
at the time when only a high probability of adverse effect exists, is
supported by an examination of the marginal benefits that flow to
defendants from such literary contracts. The sale of book or movie
rights may provide funds not only for attorney's fees, but also to
cover additional expense incurred in the course of the defense. Yet
a defendant can independently market his story to provide these
funds and thereby avoid serious ethical entanglements for his de-
fense counsel. Additionally, a defense attorney should be compen-
107. Perry, Conflict of Interest in Criminal Cases after Cuyler v. Sullivan: Time to
Reconsider the Illinois Approach, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 1 (1980).
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sated for his services in proportion to his efforts and not in propor-
tion to the bizarre or tragic nature of his client's alleged crime.
Statutory enactments by the states restricting publication
agreements reflect the public outrage aroused by a criminal
benefiting financially from the commission of a crime. Public out-
rage should be equally aroused when a defense attorney unduly
benefits from the exploitation of a criminal defendant through a
literary retainer agreement. The attorney not only participates in
this exploitation, but in doing so violates the Code of Professional
Responsibility and jeopardizes the defendant's sixth amendment
right to effective counsel. A per se rule of disqualification of all
attorneys entering into such contracts would add to both the integ-
rity of the legal profession and the quality of representation. Such
a rule should be enforced by the courts.
KEITH NOEL BOND

